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I. Introduction
The act of state doctrine is a judicially created tenet developed
to restrain courts from inquiring into the public acts of a foreign gov-
ernment committed within its own territory.' Although the act of
state doctrine has a long judicial history,2 neither courts nor com-
mentators have been able to agree on its scope or the policies under-
lying its application.3 Consequently, the doctrine has been applied
inconsistently and has fostered a confusing legacy of case law. The
case of Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. WS. Kirkpatrick, Inc. 4 (ETC) is a
recent example of the difficulties engendered by the doctrine.
In ETC, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
the use of the act of state doctrine as a defense to a claim which arose
between private parties and which implicated the questionable acts
of officials of a foreign government. The Third Circuit held that the
doctrine did not bar adjudication, and reversed the district court's
dismissal of the claim. 5
This Note examines the reasoning behind the court's decision in
* The Supreme Court reviewed the ETC Litigation on January 17, 1990. For the
Court's disposition of the case as it relates to the act of state doctrine see infra notes 176-
87 and accompanying text.
I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443
comment a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2 In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), the
Supreme Court first recognized the act of state doctrine:
The arguments in favor of [the doctrine] which have been drawn from the
general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of this
description ... that the sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to
avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such
wrongs give birth ... are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.
Id. at 146.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the roots of the doctrine can be traced back
to the 17th century. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964)
(citing Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674)).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 96-135. See generally Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of
State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their
Corporations: Choice of Law Part VI, 87 CoM. L.J. 129 (1982); Delson, The Act of State Doc-
trine-Judicial Deference or Abstention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972).
4 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
5 Id. at 1062.
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ETC, the development of the act of state doctrine, and its various
interpretations by the courts. This Note stresses the need for a con-
sistent and clear policy concerning the use of the act of state doc-
trine. In response to this need, this Note proposes that the Supreme
Court reconsider and redefine the doctrine and adopt a modified
Bernstein exception to the doctrine. 6 Finally, should the Court fail to
provide rational, clarified direction on this issue, this Note concludes
that the doctrine should be abolished in favor of legislative reform.
II. Background of Environmental Tectonics Corp. v.
W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.
The controversy in ETC involved two U.S. corporations, Envi-
ronmental Tectonics Corporation and W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., who
were competing for a military contract to build and equip an aero-
medical facility at Kaduna Air Force Base in Kaduna, Nigeria. 7 That
contract was awarded to Kirkpatrick by the Ministry Of Defense of the
Nigerian Government.8
Approximately two years later, the U.S. Department of Justice
initiated a grand jury investigation into the circumstances surround-
ing the grant of the contract. The investigation showed that Kirkpat-
rick had hired a Nigerian, Benson Akindele, to act as its local agent
in dealing with the Nigerian Government. 9 Akindele had informed
Kirkpatrick that it should pay a "sales commission" of twenty percent
of the contract price, to be used to pay Nigerian political and military
officials. 10 Kirkpatrick agreed, and paid the requested sum to two
Panamanian corporations which were controlled by Akindele.II
These corporations then distributed most of the money to Nigerian
officials. 12
The Justice Department charged W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc. and its
chairman, Harry Carpenter, with violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA).1 3 Both entered guilty pleas.
Environmentai Tectonics Corporation brought suit following
the conclusion of the criminal action, alleging that criminal conduct
by Kirkpatrick and the other defendants 14 violated federal and state
6 See infra text accompanying notes 56-64.
7 Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1386,
(D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
8 Id. at 1384.
9 Id.
10 Id.
II Id.
12 Id.
13 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1055. The FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1988), prohibits bribing,
or an offer or agreement to bribe, a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retain-
ing business.
14 Nine other defendants were named: D.I.C. (Holding) Inc., the parent company of
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick International; International Development Corporation, S.A.,
the parent company of D.I.C. (Holding) Inc.; Harry G. Carpenter, the Chairman of the
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antiracketeering statutes' 5 and the Robinson-PatmanAct. 16 The de-
fendants moved for a dismissal, alleging that the action was pre-
cluded by the act of state doctrine. 17 The district court, treating the
defendants' motion as one for summary judgment, dismissed the
case. 18
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismis-
sal of the case.' 9 While the Third Circuit agreed with the district
court on two of its conclusions, it found fault with the district court's
result and with most of the court's remaining act of state analysis. 20
First, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court's determination
that the awarding of a military procurement contract can involve suf-
ficient government interest to invoke the act of state doctrine. 2' The
court distinguished this from routine governmental acts which are of
less concern to the executive branch in its conduct of foreign pol-
icy. 22 Such "routine" acts include, for example, an award of a patent
or the acts of a bankruptcy trustee,23 which were characterized by the
court as "a near-mechanical exercise of narrowly-defined govern-
mental discretion."' 24 Second, the court agreed with the district
court's refusal to apply the "commercial exception" to the act of
state doctrine. 25 Under this exception, if acts of a sovereign state are
purely commercial in nature, the court should not invoke the act of
state doctrine to bar adjudication of the claim. 26 The Third Circuit
concluded without elaboration that the award of a defense contract is
"by its very nature governmental, ' 2 7 and therefore, not within the
Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of Kirkpatrick; Robert H. Edwards, the
President of Kirkpatrick; Benson "Tunde" Akindele, the local agent hired to act on behalf
of Kirkpatrick in'Nigeria; John M. Krankel, the Secretary and Treasurer of Kirkpatrick;
Emro Engineering Co., Inc., a subcontractor that designed the equipment sold to Nigeria
and provided engineering services on the project; Robert W. Ruppert, the President and
Chief Executive Officer of Emro; Ross E. Saxon, the Chairman of the Board of Directors
and Chief Executive Officer of Nautilus Environmentals, Inc., another subcontractor.
ETC, 847 F.2d at 1052-55.
15 Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1381. Environmental Tectonics sued to re-
cover damages for violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-68 (1988) and the NewJersey Anti-Racketeering Act,
NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2C: 41-1 (1987).
16 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988).
17 Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1384.
18 Id.
19 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1062.
20 Id. at 1058-62.
21 Id. at 1058.
22 Id. at 1058-59.
23 Id. at 1058.
24 Id. at 1059.
25 Id. The idea of a "commercial exception" to the act of state doctrine was first
introduced by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 695 (1976), but was not endorsed by the majority of the Court. See infra notes 122-28
and accompanying text.
26 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1059.
27 Id.
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scope of a commercial exception to the doctrine.
The Third Circuit then disagreed with the remainder of the dis-
trict court's act of state analysis. In particular, the ETC court criti-
cized the district court's reliance opn Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.,28 which had interpreted the act of state doctrine ex-
pansively.2 9 The Clayco court held that the act of state doctrine fore-
closes inquiry into the motivations of a sovereign's acts because such
inquiry may result in embarrassment to the foreign state or our exec-
utive branch. 30 In a sharply worded opinion, the Third Circuit as-
serted that such a conclusion is contrary to both legal precedent and
the position taken by the executive branch in a letter from its Legal
Advisor, Abraham Sofaer. 3 ' Sofaer distinguished between judicial
inquiry into the motivations behind the acts of public officials of for-
eign states as opposed to the validity of such acts.32 He stated that
the act of state doctrine " 'only precludes judicial questioning of the
validity or legality of foreign government actions.' ,,33 Sofaer's letter
further declared that " '[d]ismissal of a complaint before the devel-
opment of evidence, merely because adjudication raises the bare
possibility of embarrassment, constitutes an unwarranted expansion
of the act of state doctrine and is contrary to the flexibility with which
that doctrine should be applied.' ",34
The Third Circuit found additional support for its position that
the act of state doctrine should not be invoked so readily to preclude
adjudication in two previous Third Circuit cases: Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.3 5 and Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.36 The
ETC court stressed that the formulation of the act of state doctrine
set forth in Mannington Mills and Curtiss-Wright does not permit a
court to employ the act of state doctrine based merely on speculation
as to the effect certain disclosures might have on the sensibilities of a
28 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). The plaintiff and
defendant were in competition for an oil concession offered by Umm Al Qaywayn. Id. at
405. Clayco alleged that Occidental was awarded the contract after it bribed the petro-
leum minister and his son. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Clayco's suit on act of state grounds, stating that it was unwilling to permit judicial inquiry
into the motivation for the sovereign act. Id. at 407.
29 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1059-60.
30 Id. at 1060-61 (citing Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407).
31 Id. at 1060-62. Such a communication is termed a "Bernstein letter." See infra
notes 56-64 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit gave considerable deference to.
Sofaer's letter in part because of Sofaer's status as a former federal judge.
32 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1061.
33 Id. (quoting State Department Position Letter from Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer(Dec. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Sofaer letter], reprinted in Environmental Tectonics Corp. v.
W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1381 app. A at 1402 (D.N.J. 1987)) (emphasis in
original).
34 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1061 (quoting Sofaer letter).
35 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
36 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
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foreign government. 37 Rather, the defendant mustbe able to show
that adjudicating a plaintiff's claim poses a demonstrable threat to
the executive's conduct of foreign relations. 38 The court found that
such proof was lacking in this case, and that an inquiry into the issues
of the case need not scrutinize the validity or legality of Nigeria's
acts.39 Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the
ETC court held that the act of state doctrine did not bar adjudication
of this action. 40
Disparities such as these between the district court and the
Third Circuit in ETC are often encountered by courts addressing the
act of state issue.4 1 Such inconsistencies are due to the lack of clear
guidance by the Supreme Court. To understand the lower courts'
struggle to apply the doctrine in the ETC litigation, it is helpful to
review the development of the act of state doctrine in the Supreme
Court.
III. Development of the Act of State Doctrine
The Supreme Court set forth what is often referred to as the
"traditional formulation,- 42 or the "classic American statement, ' 43
of the act of state doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez:44
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit injudgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign pow-
ers as between themselves.
4 5
In Underhill, the defendant, a Venezuelan military general, had
forcibly taken over the government. 46 The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen
residing in Venezuela, 47 brought suit in the United States against
the general alleging unlawful confinement and assault.48 The U.S.
37 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1061.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1062.
41 See generally Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (district court did not
apply the act of state doctrine because it found no act of state. Second Circuit reversed,
finding the foreign government's refusal to repay certain funds was an act of state.
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that no act of state had been proven);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (district court felt
Hickenlooper Amendment overruled Sabbalino and thus the act of state doctrine was not a
bar to adjudication. Second Circuit disagreed and found that Citibank's counterclaim was
barred from adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of state doc-
trine did not bar adjudication).
42 Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 n.7 (1976).
43 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
44 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
45 Id. at 252.
46 Id. at 251.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that the acts of
the defendant are those of the Venezuelan Government, and thus
should not be scrutinized in U.S. courts. 49
The Underhill decision did not elaborate on whether the origins
of the act of state doctrine were rooted in international law, comity,
conflicts of laws, or political expediency. Two subsequent cases
dealing with the act of state doctrine indicated that the Court had not
yet settled on the underpinnings of the doctrine: Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co.,5 and Ricaud v. American Metal Co.5 1
Both Oeten and Ricaud involved the expropriation of goods in
Mexico by the Mexican Revolutionary Government. Although these
two cases were decided in the same year, the Supreme Court stated
differing premises on which the act of state doctrine is based. In
Oetjen, the Court applied the act of state doctrine to preclude adjudi-
cation of the case, indicating that the doctrine was a principle of "in-
ternational comity and expediency."52 The Ricaud case, relying on
both Underhill and Oetjen, reached the same result, but indicated that
the act of state doctrine was a "rule of law." 5 3 Reading these cases
together, one commentator has concluded that the act of state doc-
trine was viewed by the Court as a "legal rule based upon the prem-
ise that the act of a foreign sovereign, performed within its own
territory, could not be reviewed by an American court without im-
periling the amicable relations between governments, since the doc-
trine rested on the highest considerations of international comity
and expediency." 54 Nevertheless, these differing bases for the act of
state doctrine emerged as the first signs of judicial inconsistency, 55
and foreshadowed the confusion that courts would face in determin-
ing the scope of the doctrine.
After World War II, an important caveat to the policy ofjudicial
49 Id. at 254.
50 246 U.S. 297 (1918). The Oetjen case involved a suit by the assignee of the original
owner of some hides against the holder of the hides. Id. at 299. Mexican revolutionary
forces, which later succeeded in coming into power, had seized the hides. Id. In dis-
missing the plaintiff's action for replevin, the Court stated that "[t]o permit the validity of
the acts of one sovereign state to be re-examined and perhaps condemned by the courts of
another would very certainly imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex
the peace of nations." Id. at 304.
51 246 U.S. 304 (1918). The facts of Ricaud were substantially similar to those in
Oetjen, except that the original owner of the confiscated goods in Ricaud was a U.S. citizen.
Id. at 305.
52 Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 304.
53 Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 310. "The fact that title to the property in controversy may
have been in an American citizen .. .does not affect the rule of law that the act within its
own boundaries ... cannot become the subject of re-examination and modification in the
courts of another." Id. (relying on Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added)).
54 See Delson, supra note 3, at 88.
55 Id. (recognizing the emergence of inconsistencies when referring to the basis for
the act of state doctrine).
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abstention in act of state cases emerged: the Bernstein exception. 56
This "exception" derived from litigation involving Arnold Bernstein,
a Jew living in the United States who had formerly lived in Ger-
many.57 Bernstein sought to recover property forcibly taken from
him by the Nazi Government. 58 The Second Circuit initially refused
to adjudicate on act of state grounds. 59 Later, the court amended its
prior decree after the State Department wrote a letter setting forth
the executive's policy relieving U.S. courts from any restraint upon
the exercise of their jurisdiction in hearing Bernstein's claim. 60 Such
an advisory letter by the State Department in act of state cases is now
commonly referred to as a Bernstein letter.6 ' The Bernstein exception
precludes application of the act of state doctrine if the State Depart-
ment issues a letter informing the court that the executive branch
deems application of the doctrine unnecessary.62 Although pro-
posed in a Supreme Court opinion, the exception has never been
accepted by a majority of the Court. 63 Many lower courts, however,
have accorded Bernstein letters great deference, often seeming to fol-
low the recommendations of the State Department automatically. 64
IV. Modern Act of State Cases
From 1964 to 1976, three Supreme Court cases emerged which
make up the core of the modern act of state doctrine. All three cases
deal with the nationalization of U.S. citizens' assets by Cuba.
The first of these cases is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.65 A
commentator has described this decision as "undoubtedly one of the
56 See Bernstein v. Van Heygen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 772 (1947); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
pij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), amended, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
57 Id. at 247.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 249.
60 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
61 See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 369.
62 Id.
63 In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), the Bern-
stein exception received only three favorable votes. Id. at 767-68. Two other Justices of
the majority rejected application of the Bernstein exception and preferred to decide the case
on other grounds. Id. at 770-73 (Douglas,J., concurring in result); id. at 773-76 (Powell, J.,
concurring in judgment). In the dissent,Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall and Blackmun, strongly objected to the plurality's acceptance of the Bernstein excep-
tion. Id. at 776-93 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In a case prior to Citibank, the Supreme Court
avoided ruling on the legitimacy of the Bernstein exception. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964).
64 Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884-85
(2d Cir. 1981) (Bernstein letter indicating no objection by the executive branch to adjudica-
tion of the dispute received; act of state defense not recognized to bar adjudication of the
claim) with Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 911-12 (2d Cir.
1981) (Bernstein letter not received; act of state defense recognized).
65 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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most important international law cases to be decided by a domestic
court [in] this century." 66
The controversy in Sabbatino arose from Cuba's nationalization
of U.S. sugar interests as a reprisal against unfavorable U.S. policies
directed at the Castro Government. 67 The dispute arose between
Banco Nacional, an agency of the Cuban Government, and C.A.V., a
U.S.-owned Cuban firm which at one time owned a cargo of sugar.68
C.A.V. sold that sugar to Farr, Whitlock & Co., a brokerage firm in
the United States. 69 Farr Whitlock, with the permission of the Cu-
ban Government, sold the sugar and turned over the proceeds to
Sabbatino, a U.S. receiver representing C.A.V.'s interests. 70 Banco
Nacional sued to recover the proceeds. 71 Farr Whitlock resisted the
claim, arguing that because the expropriation violated international
law, Cuba had never acquired valid title to the sugar cargo. 72
The district court agreed with Farr Whitlock's argument, and
held that the act of state doctrine did not bar adjudication because
the act in question violated international law.7 3 The Second Circuit
affirmed on different grounds. 74
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sabbatino to address
two sensitive issues: cases involving certain U.S. foreign relations
practices, and the appropriate role of the judiciary when called upon
to review such cases. 75 The Court overruled the lower courts' deter-
mination that the act of state doctrine would not extend to an act
that was in violation of international law.76
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, set forth several ra-
tionales for judicial abstention. These included the absence of uni-
66 Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA.J. INT'L
L. 9, 29 (1970).
67 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino, the plaintiff argued that
the act of state doctrine did not preclude examination of the validity of acts of state when
those acts violate customary international law. Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. While the shipment was being loaded, Cuba nationalized the property of
C.A.V. and other Cuban corporations in which U.S. citizens held a majority interest. Id.
Farr Whitlock then contracted to purchase the sugar from a Cuban government corpora-
tion, so that the vessel could leave port. Id.
70 Id. at 376-77. The New York Supreme Court, acting pursuant to state statute, ap-
pointed receivers for the New York assets of the foreign corporations whose property was
nationalized. Id. at 377. The state court ordered Farr Whitlock to pay the receiver who
placed the money in trust. Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 379-80.
73 Id.
74 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev d, 376 U.S.
398 (1964). Despite agreeing with the result reached by the district court, the Second
Circuit left its mark on the growing body of act of state justifications, finding it "one of the
conflicts of laws rules applied by American courts .... Id. at 855.
75 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 407 (1964).
76 Id. at 439.
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versally accepted standards of international law regarding
expropriations; 77 international political sensitivity in that area; 78 the
separation of powers between the political and judicial branches; 79
and concerns that judicial involvement may hinder U.S. international
relations activities.80
In addition, the Court expressly refuted previous justifications
for the doctrine stating, "[w]e do not believe that this doctrine is
compelled either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority, as
some of the earlier decisions seem to imply .... or by some principle
of international law." 81 Instead, the Court asserted that the act of
state doctrine has constitutional underpinnings in that it relates to
the fundamental separation of powers between the branches of gov-
ernment,8 2 and that the continuing vitality of the doctrine depends
on its ability to suitably reflect the separate functions of the judical
and political branches.83
There was some division about the act of state analysis within
the Court. Justice White argued in a lengthy and persuasive dissent
that U.S. courts are obligated to adjudicate cases based on applicable
law, of which international law is a part.8 4 He also objected to the
Court's conclusion that the executive branch should have exclusive
jurisdiction over matters of international controversy.8 5 Justice
White argued that although foreign relations is assuredly within the
executive domain, it is not within the executive's exclusive control.8 6
Justice White also argued that the validity of a foreign act of state is
not inevitably a political question.8 7
77 Id. at 428-30.
78 Id. at 430.
79 Id. at 427-28.
80 Id. at 431-33. The Court noted that "[t]here are few if any issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to
expropriate the property of aliens." Id. at 428. It indicated further, however, that when
there are areas of international law that have a greater consensus as to applicable stan-
dards, U.S. courts are not-"broadly foreclosed" from addressing such issues. Id. at 430
n.34. The act of state doctrine may still be applicable "even if [customary] international
law has been violated." Id. at 431. In addition to the concerns over deciding nebulous
areas of customary international law, the Court stressed the importance of maintaining the
"proper distribution of functions between the judical and political branches of the Gov-
ernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs." Id. at 427-28. The Court reasoned that
judicial involvement by U.S. courts in such matters would be "likely to give offense" to the
other country, id. at 432, or might "provide embarrassment to the Executive Branch." Id.
at 433.
81 Id. at 421 (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250 (1897)).
82 Id. at 423.
83 Id. at 427-28.
84 Id. at 450-51 (White, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 461-62 (White, J, dissenting).
86 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court phrased its holding in Sabbatino narrowly,
stating:
[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the valid-
ity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sover-
eign government . . . in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles,
even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary inter-
national law.
8 8
Despite this limited holding, lower courts have embraced the ex-
tensive ruminations of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino to jistify ap-
plying the act of state doctrine to cases that had nothing to do with
foreign expropriations.8"
The Sabbatino case prompted a profusion of commentary, 90 and
Congress, which sought to neutralize Sabbalino, responded by enact-
ing the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964.91 This amendment removed certain types of actions involving
claims of title to property in the United States from the purview of
the act of state doctrine, 92 but the scope of the statute has been con-
fined to cases involving confiscated property brought into the United
States.93 One commentator has noted that while the Hickenlooper
Amendment would appear to nullify a great portion of the act of
state doctrine, in fact it has had almost no effect. 94
The Supreme Court next addressed the act of state doctrine in
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,95 commonly refered
88 Id. at 428.
89 See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406
(9th Cir. 1983) (bribery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981) (antitrust), cert. denied, 454'U.S. 1163 (1982).
90 See Lillich, supra note 66, at 28-37; see also Reeves, The Sabbatino Case and the Sabba-
tino Amendment: Comedy--or Tragedy--of Errors, 20 VAND. L. REV. 429 (1967); Falk, The Com-
plexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964).
91 Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1012-13 (1964) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)). The Hickenlooper Amendment to the For-
eign Assistance Act provided that:
No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the prin-
ciples of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state ... based upon...
a confiscation or other taking ... by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of compensation.
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 1, § 443 n.2.
93 See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d
Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1968).
94 See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 393. Bazyler notes that the amendment was applied
successfully only one time, in the remand of the Sabbatino litigation. Id. He sets forth sev-
eral reasons for its lack of impact. These include the fact that the amendment has received
a narrow interpretation that excludes all contract claims. Id. In addition, it is inapplicable
to claims made by a foreign state's own nationals. Id. Lastly, Bazyler states that courts
require the situs of the confiscated property or its proceeds to be in the United States. Id.
95 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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to as Citibank.96 This case also involved an expropriation by the Cu-
ban Government. The lower courts in Citibank, as in Sabbatino, dis-
agreed over the appropriate application of the act of state doctrine,
and were particularly divided about the effect of the newly-created
Hickenlooper Amendment. 97 The district court felt that the amend-
ment had "for all practical purposes" overruled Sabbatino, and there-
fore would have heard the case.98 The Second Circuit, however,
found that the amendment was not controlling, 99 and that Sabbatino
barred adjudication of the Citibank counterclaim. 0 0 In a five-to-
four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, hold-
ing that the act of state doctrine did not bar a decision on the mer-
its.'°' Although five justices agreed on the result, 10 2 they could not
agree on the reasons behind it.
justice Rehnquist, writing for the three-justice plurality, found
the Bernstein exception dispositive.' 0 3 He viewed the act of state doc-
trine primarily as a means to avoid embarrassing the executive
branch in its conduct of foreign relations and concluded that this
required deference to the State Department. 1° 4 In essence, the plu-
rality followed Sabbatino, while voicing the strongest endorsement of
the the Bernstein exception to date. A majority of the justices, how-
ever, rejected the Bernstein exception.' 0 5
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, but did not accept the
view that the doctrine requires the judiciary to receive the executive's
permission to adjudicate an act of state case.' 0 6 He would have
rested the decision on the grounds that there was no conflict in Ci-
tibank between the judicial and political branches. 0 7 justice Douglas
appeared to rely on equitable principles of "fair dealing."' 0 8 In an
ardent dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by justices Blackmun, Stew-
art, and Marshall, refused to recognize the Bernstein exception, argu-
96 See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 328.
97 The Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted in 1964, the same year Sabbatino was
decided. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
98 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
99 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 431 F.2d 394, 399-402 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
100 Id. at 394-95.
101 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 769-70.
102 justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White.
Justices Douglas and Powell, concurring in the result, explained their reasoning in two
separate opinions.
10s Citibank, 406 U.S. at 767-68. For a discussion of the Bernstein exception, see supra
text accompanying notes 56-64.
104 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765-68.
105 Id. at 776-93 (Brennan,J.,joined by Blackmun, Marshall, and Stewart,JJ., dissent-
ing); id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 776 (Powell, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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ing that it would allow politics, not law, to dictate judicial results.' 0 9
The third important modern act of state case is Alfred Dunhill,
Inc. v. Cuba. I 10 Once again, the lower courts could not agree on the
application of the act of state doctrine,"' and the Supreme Court
again was unable to gather majority support for a clear guideline on
the doctrine.
The Dunhill litigation arose out of the Cuban Government's na-
tionalization of five privately owned cigar manufacturers. 1 2 The
Cuban government turned the operation of these companies over to
"interventors." 113 Dunhill, a U.S. importer, continued to receive
and accept shipments from the cigar manufacturers, and paid the in-
terventors for those transactions. 1 4 These payments covered ship-
ments of goods sent both pre- and post-intervention.11 5 The former
owners, now residents of the United States, sued Dunhill for the
value of the pre-intervention shipments. 1 6 The Dunhill court had to
decide whether the act of state doctrine was implicated by the in-
terventors' refusal to reimburse the importers for sums that the im-
porters had paid to the interventors, but which were owed to the
former owners.' 1 7
The Supreme Court, by a vote of five-to-four, refused to apply
the act of state doctrine on the basis that no act of state had been
proven. Justice White, writing the plurality opinion of the Court,
concluded that the facts did not show the interventors' refusal to in-
demnify the importers constituted a public act on behalf of a sover-
eign."" The Court reasoned that the interventors' refusal to repay
funds to Dunhill did not necessarily constitute anything more than
109 Id. at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also noted that the avoid-
ance of embarrassment to the executive branch depended upon speculation as to a court's
holding on the validity of foreign acts. Id. at 782-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1l0 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
Ill The district court refused to apply the act of state doctrine because it found no
evidence that the Cuban Government had formally repudiated its obligation to repay the
pre-intervention funds. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 545-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified sub nom., Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom., Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). On appeal, the Second
Circuit found that although the Cuban Government had made no formal decree, the re-
fusal to make payment was an act of state. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1370-
74 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). Thus,
the act of state doctrine barred affirmative recovery by the importers against the in-
terventors. Id. at 1373-74.
112 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 685.
113 Id. The Court defined "interventors" as "those named to possess and occupy the
seized businesses" after their nationalization ("intervention") by Cuba. Id. at 682.
'14 Id. at 686.
115 Id.
116 Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified
sub nom., Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nor., Alfred
Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
117 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 686-90.
118 Id. at 691-93 (citing The "Gul Djemal," 264 U.S. 90 (1924)).
506 [VOL. 14
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
their initial claim of entitlement to the pre-intervention funds. 1 9 Be-
cause the interventors relied on only commercial, and not sovereign,
authority to assert their rights to the property and the Cuban Gov-
ernment had not issued any formal decree or resolution on the mat-
ter,- the Court held that the interventors could not assert an act of
state defense. ' 20
Despite holding that no act of state had been proven, the Dunhill
Court, in dicta, considered the formation of a commercial exception
to the act of state doctrine. Justice White reasoned that the act of
state doctrine should not be extended to apply to the "purely com-
mercial" acts of a foreign sovereign, even if an act of state could be
shown.'21 Three other Justices also endorsed this proposition. 22
Four Justices joined in a dissenting opinion which disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the expropriation in this case was
not an act of state,' 23 and attacked the commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine proposed by the plurality. 124 Justice Marshall,
writing for the dissent, argued that an act of state need not take any
particular form,' 2 5 and that passive conduct, such as that evidenced
by the interventors' refusal to return the funds to Dunhill, could be
included within its scope.' 2 6 The dissent then leveled a scathing at-
tack on the plurality's recognition of a commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine. According to Justice Marshall, "[t]he carving
out of broad exceptions to the [act of state] doctrine is fundamen-
tally at odds with the careful case-by-case approach adopted in
Sabbatino."127
A Bernstein letter setting forth the State Department's views on
119 Id. at 691.
120 Id. at 693-95.
121 Id. at 695. Justice White stated, "[wie decline to extend the act of state doctrine to
acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial opera-
tions." Id. at 706. He distinguished between "public and governmental" acts and the
"commercial or proprietary" acts of a sovereign state. Id. at 698. Citing several sovereign
immunity cases for support of this proposition, Justice White reasoned that because a
commercial exception was recognized under sovereign immunity, it should likewise be rec-
ognized under the act of state doctrine. Id. at 703-05. He concluded that "the mere asser-
tion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a
foreign sovereign is no more effective if given the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the
label 'sovereign immunity.' " Id. at 705.
122 ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist endorsed the "commercial
exception" to the act of state doctrine. Id. at 695-706. Justice Stevens concurred in the
result, but refused to join the Court in creating a commercial exception to the doctrine.
Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 715-16 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting).
124 Id. at 728-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 719-20 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 716 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 728 (Marshall,J., dissenting). One commentator has noted that Justice Mar-
shall "did not rule out the selective use of the commercial exception in future cases." See
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 343 n.105 (citing Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 728-29). This conclusion
rests on Marshall's statement: "In the final analysis . . . it is unnecessary to consider
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application of the act of state doctrine was obtained by the Supreme
Court.' 28 The letter advocated overruling Sabbatino.' 29 The dissent
pointed out that the State Department had urged just the opposite
position when Sabbatino was before the Court. 130 The Bernstein letter
did not seem to carry much weight with any of the Justices in this
case. While the Justices retained the doctrine, they found it inappli-
cable to the facts of Dunhill.'3 '
Given such discord within the Supreme Court, it is inevitable
that lower federal courts dealing with the doctrine would struggle
under the lack of clear and consistent guidance. 132 The difficulties
are compounded by the unfortunate fact that the leading act of state
cases from the Supreme Court have dealt only with the narrow issue
of expropriations by foreign governments.l 3 3 This has left the lower
courts in the position of applying an already confusing doctrine to
novel fact situations,' 34 with only the Sabbatino, Citibank, and Dunhill
line of Supreme Court cases for guidance. These lower court cases
mirror the discord found in the Supreme Court and further contrib-
ute to the doctrine's instability, as is demonstrated by the ETC
litigation.
V. Environmental Tectonics Corp. and the Act of State Doctrine
The ETC litigation clearly reflects some of the difficulties plagu-
ing the lower courts in their attempts to apply the act of state doc-
trine. A comparison of the two cases from other lower federal courts
whether the exception would be responsive to the concerns underlying the act of state
doctrine in every case to which it might apply." Id.
128 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 696.
129 Id. at 697-98 n.12. The State Department's Berntein letter stated: " '[I]t is our
view that if the Court should decide to overrule the holding in Sabbatino so that acts of
state would thereafter be subject to adjudication in American courts under international
law, we would not anticipate embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy of the
United States.' " Id. at 710-11 (quoting State Department Position Letter from Legal Ad-
visor Monroe Leigh (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
app. I at 706 (1976)).
13o Id. at 725 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 In ignoring the State Department's views on the applicability of the act of state
doctrine, Justice Rehnquist departs from his own earlier position in Citibank, where he
advocated deference to the executive's recommendations. See First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1972).
132 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287
(3d Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
134 See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1983) (bribery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (antitrust), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Phoe-
nix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1983) (oil concession dis-
pute); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1983),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (human rights).
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which were relied upon by the district court and the Third Circuit
illustrates the doctrine's erratic application.
A. ETC in the District Court
After acknowledging the various historical foundations given for
the act of state doctrine,' 3 5 the district court stated that a corner-
stone in the doctrine's application is the "avoidance of 'passing on
the validity' of acts of foreign governments." 36 The court, however,
reasoned that "if the inquiry presented for judicial determination in-
cludes the motivation of a sovereign act which would result in embar-
rassment to the sovereign or constitute interference in the conduct
of foreign policy of the United States, inquiry is foreclosed by the act
of state doctrine."' 37 This motivation-validity distiction came to
form the basis for a hair-splitting debate between the district court
and the Third Circuit, and is illustrative of the confusing and cum-
bersome analysis with which the lower courts apply the act of state
doctrine.
The district court followed the analysis of the act of state doc-
trine used by the Ninth Circuit in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. 138 Clayco, an oil company, sued one of its competi-
tors, Occidental, claiming that Occidental had bribed a foreign offi-
cial in order to obtain an offshore oil concession.' 39 The Ninth
Circuit applied the act of state doctrine to preclude adjudication, as-
serting that the acts of the sovereign dealt with "public" rather than
private interests.140 In addition, the Clayco court noted that adjudica-
135 Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1392
(D.N.J. 1987), 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
136 Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964)).
137 Id. at 1392-93 (citing Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712
F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984)) (emphasis added).
138 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). The district court
felt that Clayco involved a "strikingly similar factual situation" to the one presented in ETC.
Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1393.
139 Clayco, 712 F.2d at 405 n. 1. Clayco claimed that Occidental's payment to the sultan
of Umm Al Qaywayn violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-I to -2, 78ff(a), (c) (1988). The FCPA prohibits the pay-
ment of bribes by U.S. businesses to officials of foreign governments. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I
to -2. The Clayco court held that actions by private parties, however, are not available
when a foreign government is involved, despite the fact that the FCPA permits actions by
private parties. Clayco,, 712 F.2d at 409. As one commentator has noted, under such rea-
soning, all private lawsuits under the FCPA will be barred since any FCPA action necessar-
ily involves payment to an official of a foreign government. See Bayzler, supra note 3, at
357. -,
140 Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406. According to the Clayco court, the sovereign's actions of
granting oil concessions, unlike the debt repudiation and nationalization of foreign assets
that occurred in Dunhill, could not have been taken by a private citizen. Id. at 408. Thus,
the actions are "public" and come within the scope of the act of state doctrine, Id. Such
reasoning, however, is subject to critcism because it is unlikely that the activity in Dunhill
could have been accomplished by a private citizen. Further, in distinguishing between
public and private interests, the Clayco court stated: "This case differs from those relied
upon by [plaintiff], in which sovereign activity merely formed the background to the dis-
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tion of the case would require an examination into the motives of the
foreign sovereign in taking the bribe, which the court was reluctant
to do.
14 1
The district court in ETC found the facts before it analogous to
those of Clayco, and thus concluded that the awarding of the military
contract by the Nigerian Government in ETC was a public, sovereign
act.' 42 The district court also embraced the Clayco court's expansive
application of the act of state doctrine which would preclude inquiry
into the motives of a foreign sovereign. 143 Although the Clayco
court's analysis applies this policy when adjudication would cause
"embarrassment" to the executive,' 44 the district court adopted an
even broader reading of the doctrine. The district court reasoned
that inquiry into the motives of the Nigerian Government would tend
to make our foreign policy conduct with them "more difficult," and
indicated that this threshold was sufficient to invoke application of
the doctrine. 145
If such a standard were routinely used by courts, the practical
effect would be to bar the adjudication of any claim when a foreign
government's acts are involved, even if the sovereign is not a party to
the dispute. Furthermore, there is no historical judicial support for
such an expansive application of the act of state doctrine. Sabbatino,
as well as other courts, confined application of the doctrine to inquir-
ies into the validity of foreign acts of state. 146
B. ETC in the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit in ETC relied primarily on Williams v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 147 another Third Circuit case, to reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment. 148 In Curtiss- Wright, the plaintiff
Williams alleged that the defendant monopolized the market, and
illegally induced foreign governments into refusing to purchase jet
engines and parts from the plaintiff.149 Curtiss-Wright moved to dis-
miss Williams' complaint on act of state grounds, arguing that the
pute or in which the only governmental actions were the neutral application of the laws."
Id. at 406.
141 Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406-07.
142 Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1393-
94 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
143 ld at 1394 (relying on Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407).
144 Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407.
145 Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1394.
146 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see also Williams v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982); Industrial Investment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, Mitsui & Co. v. Industrial
Investment Development Corp., 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
147 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
148 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1062.
149 Curtiss-Wright, 694 F.2d at 303.
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doctrine precluded the examination of foreign governments' motives
in refusing to buy engine parts from the plaintiff. The district court
denied the motion, 150 and the Third Circuit affirmed.15 1
The ETC court noted that Curtiss-Wright had "rejected an ap-
proach to the doctrine that would in all circumstances foreclose judi-
cial scrutiny of the motivations behind the military procurement
decisions of a foreign government."' 152 As further support for appli-
cation of a "validity" rather than a "motivation" standard of inquiry,
the ETC court cited the letter from the State Department's Legal
Advisor, Abraham Sofaer, which stated that the " 'doctrine only pre-
cludes judicial questioning of the validity or legality of foreign govern-
ment actions.' "153
There has been continuing disagreement and confusion in the
lower courts over whether to use the motivation or validity standard
of inquiry in determining whether the act of state doctrine should be
applied to prohibit adjudication of the case.' 54 One court even
stated that inquiry into the motivations behind an act of a foreign
government would inevitably involve a determination of the validity
of that act.' 55 The motivation versus validity distinction in the ETC
litigation may have been a function of how the two courts character-
ized the conduct being examined in the case. While the district court
in ETC believed it would be necessary to scrutinize the conduct of
Nigeria for resolution of the claims, 156 the Third Circuit focused its
150 Id. at 301-02.
15l Id. at 305.
152 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1060. As was noted by one commentator, the use of a motivation
inquiry standard for application of the doctrine "precludes adjudication in the United
States of most international transaction cases." Bazyler, supra note 3, at 347.
153 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1061 (quoting Sofaer letter (emphasis in original)). Support for
this view can also be traced to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401,
431-33 (1968), Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697, 706 (1976), and another
Third Circuit case, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1979).
154 Compare Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1983) (adopting the motivation standard), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) and Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.) (adopting the motivation standard), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 984 (1977) with Williams v. Curtiss-Wright, 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982) (adopt-
ing the validity standard) and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287
(3d Cir. 1979) (adopting the validity standard).
155 Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 76-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977). The district court in ETC also hinted that inquiries into either the motives or the
validity of a foreign sovereign's acts lack distinction. After noting that the reasoning un-
derlying the act of state doctrine as set forth in Sabbatino was the avoidance of "passing on
the validity" of acts of foreign governments, the district court concluded that if the inquiry
is one which includes the motivation of a sovereign act, such inquiry is also foreclosed by
the act of state doctrine. Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirpatrick, Inc., 659 F.
Supp. 1381, 1392-93 (D.N.J. 1987), revd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
156 Id. at 1395. The district court stated that, in addition to proving a bribe was paid
to or anticipated by Nigerian officials, "inquiry would have to be had as to the effect of the
payment or promise of payment of such a bribe." Id. Thus, the court reasoned, inquiry
into the motivations of the Nigerian Government was "necessary for resolution of the
case." Id.
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inquiry primarily on the conduct of the defendants.157
Another troublesome aspect of the ETC litigation is the courts'
treatment of the Bernstein letter from the State Department's Legal
Advisor, Sofaer. The letter stated that it was the position of the State
Department that inquiry into the motivations of the Nigerian Gov-
ernment was not precluded by the act of state doctrine in this
case. 158 However, the district court relied on a portion of Sofaer's
letter which stressed the Department's concerns over the potential
affect certain inquiries and discovery proceedings may have on U.S.
foreign relations. The letter urged that "caution and due regard for
foreign sovereign sensibilities be exercised at each relevant stage in the
proceedings."15 9 The district court concluded that the State Depart-
ment had failed to give a clear position on the application of the act
of state doctrine in this case, and in fact, had improperly delegated
part of its job to the courts. 160 The court stated that "[t]he sugges-
tion of the State Department that this court conduct the litigation
with an eye to foreign policy concerns is not appropriate. Such a
precedent poses a serious threat to the authority of the executive
branch to conduct foreign policy." 6 '
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, saw this expression of
concern by the State Department as merely a reminder to courts su-
pervising discovery proceedings to do so with care because the broad
discovery authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
often criticized by foreign governments.' 62 The Third Circuit fo-
cused instead on a part of Sofaer's letter which stated that the act of
state doctrine " 'only precludes judicial questioning of the validity or
legality of foreign government actions.' ",163 The State Department's
Bernstein letter concluded that the act of state doctrine would not bar
adjudication of the dispute because the allegations in this case did
not involve judicial inquiry into the validity of the Nigerian Govern-
ment's decision to award the contract.' 64
The Third Circuit, however, may have necessitated future use of
Bernstein letters by any party asserting the act of state defense by re-
157 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1061. The Third Circuit noted that, "[appellant does not seek
to have the Air Force contract invalidated, nor does it seek compensation for its alleged
losses from the Nigerian government." Id. Thus, the inquiry is merely into whether "ap-
pellees' alleged bribery of Nigerian officials motivated the award of the contract." Id.
158 Environmentat Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1396-97 (citing Sofaer letter).
159 Id. at 1397 (quoting Sofaer letter) (emphasis added).
160 Id.
161 Id. (quoting Sofaer letter).
162 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1062 n.l I.
163 Id, at 1061 (quoting Sofaer letter (emphasis in original)). The Third Circuit ac-
knowledged the deference it accorded the State Department's assessments by characteriz-
ing the Department's letter as "[t]he only information before the court authoritatively
measuring the impact such a determination might have on the executive's conduct of for-
eign policy." Id. (emphasis added).
164 Id. at 1061-62.
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quiring "that a defendant come forward with proof that adjudication
of a plaintiff's claim poses a demonstrable, not a speculative, threat
to the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the
United States government."1 65
The differing interpretations taken by the district court and the
Third Circuit towards the State Department's Bernstein letter high-
light some of the problems that can arise when there is a lack of clear
and consistent guidance for judicial resolution of act of state cases.
The Bernstein exception would require that courts give deference to
the State Department's position concerning the impact that litigating
a case would have upon U.S. foreign policy. While the exception has
not been endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court, 166 lower
courts have continued to rely on such letters for guidance when a
case raises concerns of interference with U.S. foreign policy. 167 The
problem with this practice is that nearly all cases involving interna-
tional transactions have the potential to interfere with the foreign
policy interests of the United States.' 68 While it is the proper prac-
tice of the judiciary to leave matters of foreign policy to the executive
branch, it would be a serious error to defer automatically to the exec-
utive in any case involving international litigants. To promote its
role in the international economy, the United States needs a judici-
ary that can respond to and foster international activities. In addi-
tion, reliance on the executive branch to determine when the
judiciary should apply the doctrine poses serious threats to the fun-
damental principle of separation of powers. 169
Part of the blame may also rest with the State Department.
While input and guidance from the executive branch is valuable in
dealing with potentially sensitive foreign policy matters, caution
should be taken to ensure that these letters do not merely reflect the
political mood of the moment. In addition, if the Department issues
advisory letters in an ambiguous manner, which may then generate
divergent interpretations by courts, those letters are of little gui-
dance to courts in resolving act of state issues, regardless of the de-
gree of deference accorded to them. The different readings that can
be given to these letters, as clearly demonstrated by the ETC litiga-
165 Id. at 1061 (citing Williams v. Curtiss-Wright, 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979)).
166 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See supra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
168 In the context of international law violations, Justice White's dissent recognized
the dangers a blanket application of the act of state doctrine might have: "The achieve-
ment of a minimum amount of stability and predictability in international commercial
transactions is not assured by a rule of nonreviewability which permits any act of a foreign
state ... to pass muster in the courts of other states." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398, 459 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
169 U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2'
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tion, serve only to contribute to the tangled web of inconsistencies
that characterize the modern act of state doctrine.
Unfortunately, the battle over the applicability of the act of state
doctrine seems all too likely to come at the cost of forgetting the
litigants. Clearly, if the defendants in ETC had bribed officials of a
private foreign corporation, the plaintiff could seek redress in U.S.
courts.' 70 Should the plaintiff be denied access to the courts merely
because of the fortuitous circumstance that the defendant had bribed
an official of a foreign government?
VI. Alternatives to the Act of State Doctrine
The decision in ETC documents much of the uncertainty and
inconsistency plaguing courts in their attempts to address the act of
state doctrine. It also vividly illustrates the need for a rational and
consistent policy concerning the doctrine. One problem accentuated
by the ETC litigation is whether the motivation or validity inquiry
standard should govern application of the doctrine, or if, in fact,
there is any distiction between these approaches at all. Another un-
resolved issue is the role of the Bernstein exception in the courts'
determinations.
In addition to clarifying the doctrine for future litigants, the
Supreme Court should adopt a modified Bernstein exception to the
doctrine-one that is not really an exception, but a procedure which
allows for the executive's input while continuing normal adjudicatory
processes. The Court should dispense with the traditional Bernstein
exception, which directs courts to abstain from adjudicating act of
state claims unless the State Department expresses its opinion that
litigating the case would not hinder U.S. conduct of foreign rela-
tions. Instead, the Court should adopt an approach which provides
notice of the action to the State Department. The State Department
could then submit an amicus brief detailing the executive's position
on the matter. Another alternative is to allow the executive branch
to appear before the court and submit proof on the issue. If sensitive
matters of foreign policy are implicated by the action, protections
can be had by way of closed hearings. This evidence can then be
weighed by the court as one of several factors to consider in deter-
mining whether or not the act of state doctrine should be applied to
bar adjudication of the claim, rather than giving blind deference to
the State Department's views.
By adopting this proposed modified Bernstein procedure al-
170 Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1988). RICO provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court ..... Id. § 1964(c). Bribery is listed in § 1961 as a "racketeering activity"
prohibited by § 1962. Id. at § 1961.
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lowing the executive to submit proof in a specified fashion, courts
which seek to evaluate the impact of an act of state adjudication on
the conduct of foreign policy can do so within accepted judicial pro-
cedures. Thus, the courts continue their roles as adjudicators of dif-
ficult issues and the fundamental U.S. principle of separation of
powers is preserved.
There are many views on how clarification of the doctrine is best
accomplished, 17 1 but the underlying message is clear-something
must be done. In light of the fact that the act of state doctrine is a
judicially created rule, the burden of clarification rests with the
courts, particularly with the Supreme Court.
The only realistic alternative to judicial clarification of the act of
state doctrine by the Supreme Court would be to abolish the doc-
trine by either judicial or legislative action. This approach has been
urged by some commentators.' 72 One commentator emphasized
that the doctrine should be abolished because it "fosters arbitrary
and unpredictable adjudication of international disputes, under-
mines judicial independence, weakens the intended force of several
United States laws, and arrests the development of international law
by American courts." 173 The commentator's point is well taken.
Should the Supreme Court fail to provide a meaningful clarification
of the doctrine, its abolition would be better than its continued in-
consistent application. The consequence of continuing along the
present course will be to hamper the stability and predictability
needed for parties who are developing and participating in interna-
tional traisactions.
VII.. Conclusion
The United States is part of an ever-expanding global economy
that requires some measure of stability to promote its continuance.
We must look to the judiciary to provide a framework for legal stabil-
ity to meet these needs. The State Department in ETC pronounced
that "the act of state doctrine is based on the need to avoid unprinci-
pled decisions resulting from the absence of legal standards."1 74 Ju-
dicial interpretation of the doctrine, however, is the primary culprit
in undermining that goal. Courts can no longer afford to disregard
their responsibility to develop a clear and consistent policy regarding
the use of the act of state doctrine. In July 1989, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in ETC to resolve the act of state issue in that
171 See generally Bazyler, supra note 3; Dellapenna, supra note 3; Mathias, Restructuring the
Act of State Doctrine.- A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
172 See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3 at 384; Hoagland, The Act of State Doctrine: Abandon It,
14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 317, 338-341 (1986).
173 Bazyler, supra note 3, at 384.
174 ETC, 847 F.2d at 1061.
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case. 17 5 The Supreme Court must use this opportunity to reassess
and clarify the doctrine. By enunciating a uniform structure for anal-
ysis, the Court can provide a greater measure of certainty to U.S.
interests in the expanding global economy.
Recent Development
On January 17, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled on the applica-
bility of the act of state doctrine to the ETC litigation. 176 Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the judgment of the
Third Circuit, which held that the act of state doctrine did not bar
adjudication of the claim.' 7 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that be-
cause the legality of the Nigerian Government contract is not a ques-
tion the district court "must decide,"178 the act of state doctrine is not
applicable to bar adjudication.
While the Supreme Court clarified some aspects of the act of
state doctrine, its analysis fell far short of the broad range of ques-
tions and inconsistencies the doctrine has engendered. 179 The court
construed the scope of the act of state doctrine narrowly. It ex-
pressly rejected using various bases previously accepted as policies
underlying the doctrine'8 0 as the sole determinant of whether or not
the doctrine is applicable. Instead, the Court characterized the doc-
trine as a "rule of decision,"' 8 1 and in doing so gave some guidance
to lower courts. Specifically, the Court provided:
Courts. in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obli-
gation to decide cases and controversies properly presented to
them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for
cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments,
but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of for-
eign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed
valid. 182
The Court did not discount the importance of considering the
policies underlying the act of state doctrine altogether. The policies
mentioned by the Court include international comity, respect for the
sovereignty of foreign nations, and the avoidance of embarrassment
to the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations. 8 3 Ac-
175 Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3841 (U.S. June 26, 1989) (No. 87-2006).
176 W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 1990).
177 Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d
Cir. 1988), affd, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1990).
178 WVS. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. at 4141 (emphasis in original).
179 See supra notes 42-134 and accompanying text.
180 I.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. at 4141. Such policies include "international
comity, respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations, and the avoidance of embarassment
to the Executive Branch in its conduct of foreign relations." Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 4143.
18: Id. at 4141.
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cording to the Court, these policies still come into play in deciding
whether, "despite the doctrine's technical availability, it should
nonetheless not be invoked."' 84 It appears that the Court has really
created a two-step test to be used in determining the applicability of
the act of state doctrine. First, because the action of a foreign sover-
eign occurring within its territory is deemed valid, if the outcome of
the case before a U.S. court turns upon the effect of that official act,
the act of state doctrine generally will apply to bar adjudication. Sec-
ond, despite the doctrine's applicability, if the various policies un-
derlying the doctrine are implicated only slightly, the act' of state
doctrine may not necessarily be a bar to adjudication. The Court
stressed using this balancing test to ensure that the judiciary was not
incapacitating itself by applying the act of state doctrine where the
acts of a foreign sovereign are not directly involved.' 8 5
The Court made passing reference both to the proposed com-
mercial exception and Bernstein exception to the doctrine, 18 6 which
were issues argued by the parties in this case. Reflecting a desire to
resolve the act of state issue in ETC as narrowly as possible, however,
the Court declined to address these exceptions since "the factual
predicate for application of the act of state doctrine does not
exist." 187
Whether the Court's attempt to clarify the scope of the act of
state doctrine was successful remains to be seen. There is still
enough latitude for lower courts to become mired in the policy im-
plications of the doctrine, but the Court has provided a fairly clear
guideline to overcome at least the initial hurdle of whether or not the
act of state doctrine issue is implicated at all.
SANDRA ELIZABETH TREMPER
184 Id. at 4143.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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